In various official documents, the European Union has declared its goal to pursue a citizen-centric governance of digital transformation. Through a critical review of several of these documents, here we show how “citizen-centric” is more a glamouring than a driving concept. De facto, the EU is enabling a federated data system that is corporate-driven, economic-oriented, and GDPR-compliant; in other words, a Digital Single Market (DSM). This leaves out societal and collective-level dimensions of digital transformation—such as social inclusion, digital sovereignty, and (...) environmental sustainability—which are acknowledged, but not operationalized, by the EU as pillars of a citizen-centric governance. Hence, the door is open to a complementary approach to the governance of digital transformation. We argue that, while a federated data model can constitute the tech-legal backbone of the emerging DSM, a commoning of data, as an ecosystemic approach that maintains a societal and collective outlook by default, can represent a complement to enact a truly citizen-centric governance. (shrink)

The author argues that there is a sharp contrast between Plato's earlier teleological explanation of nature and his later conception. In the Phaedo Anaxagoras' νοṽς as a teleological principle is rejected, the forms taking its place, in the Philebus the existence of a νοṽς explaining order and finality in nature, is strictly demonstrated. After that nature and consequences of this new doctrine are briefly discussed : the ineffable character of the transcendent cause of the world ; the reduction of the (...) number of the Forms to those of substances in nature ; the causality of νοṽς as an immanent and intermediate one ; the foundation of a mathematical science of nature. Thirdly the author makes an effort to reconstruct the philosophical grounds of this development, starting from the three theses, on which the argumentation of the Philebus is based. 1) νοṽς can only exist in a soul. It is argued that the dynamic conception of soul in the Phaedrus logically leads to the conclusion, that νοṽς also is movement . 2) To explain cosmic order and finality a νοṽς has to be accepted. This new idea occurs for the first time in the Sophistes and in the myth of the Politicus. 3) Cosmic order has a mathematical and astronomical character. This aspect is absent before the Philebus and seems to have been a consequence of Plato's discovery of the regularity in the planitary motions . Finally the author thinks he can indicate in the Sophistes the turning-point in the theory of Forms, as a result of the extension of the notion of being. (shrink)

After some preliminaries concerning the original character of Rawls's formulation of the problem of social justice the author discusses the question, whether the proposed principles of justice for the basic structure of society bear the marks of a liberal theory.The conclusion of this part (IA) is that Rawls seems to have in view a mixed society, or perhaps rather a society which transcends the contrast between liberalism and socialism.Some critics have ascribed to Rawls the view of man of classical liberalism (...) and for this reason have considered him a liberal. The author contends that these critics do not seem to have grasped the purely methodological significance of the concept of the original position. After some preliminaries concerning the original character of Rawls's formulation of the problem of social justice the author discusses the question, whether the proposed principles of justice for the basic structure of society bear the marks of a liberal theory.The conclusion of this part (IA) is that Rawls seems to have in view a mixed society, or perhaps rather a society which transcends the contrast between liberalism and socialism.Some critics have ascribed to Rawls the view of man of classical liberalism and for this reason have considered him a liberal. The author contends that these critics do not seem to have grasped the purely methodological significance of the concept of the original position. After a short interlude in which the conceptions of justice of Marx and Rawls are compared (IB) the author presents some considerations of a critical nature as regards the principles of justice (IC). The distinction between the general and the special conception of justice hinges on the lixical priority of freedom. Now, a contradiction seems to emerge between the fact that the choice in favor of the special conception is an absolute one, valid for all societies regardless of time and place, and the fact that the general conception is sometimes presented as a first phase in the evolution of a well-ordered society (sect.82). This is an indication that in Rawl's theory the priority of freedom is not as absolute as he thinks it to be. The decisive point in this respect seems to be the fact that the „fair value of liberty” (Sect. 36) would demand that a subsistence minimum is lexically prior to freedom. These seem to be serious inconsistencies for which nnno remedy can be found and which are apt to lead us back to „instuitionism” The author considers next (and this is his main point) the logical structure of Rawls's contract theory, which in his opinion stands in urgent need of clarification. It is argued that the concept of contract as such implies a certain indifference or indeterminateness as regards its result. At the other hand, the result (that which is agreed upon, i.e. the principles of justice) is ex hypothesi considered to explain „our considered judgements” in reflective equilibrium. In this way it appears that Rawl's central idea (rather implicitly) is : there exists a consensus as regards our considered judgements concerning justice and this consensus may be explained as resulting from a (hypothetical) contract. So the argument really is of a hypothetico-deductive nature and it would have been much better if Rawls had been clear about it himself. Some critical considerations follow. First attention is paid to the fact that strict observance is an essential element of the concept of contract and that from this point of view the three psychological laws (chapt. VIII) are of crucial importance to the theory. Their nature, however, is not altogether clear. They are neither empirical laws (because they presuppose a just institutional structure and a just society is said not to exist), nor are they a priori ones. So it is only left for us to say that they are construed as empirical laws. Now, the difficulty for Rawls with this must be that reliance on such laws is inconsistent with the rationality of the parties in the original position, because as a matter of fact these laws have not been tested empirically (the fact that they can not be tested in this way makes no difference at all). Secondly it is asked whether we are dealing with a contract doctrine at all. Starting from the question, whether in this theory the notion of contract (intended to explain our considered judgements as givens) really is an ultimate explanatory concept, it is argued that there are some anthropological presuppositions, which rather point in the direction of a theory of self-realization. This seems to be confirmed by some other features of the theory, e. g. the Aristotelian principle, the Kantian interpretation, the concept of natural rights, and society as a social union of social unions. In conclusion, neither Rawls's principles of justice nor his contract theory are sufficiently consistent to escape the need of reconsideration. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to introduce a complexity in the debate on the meaning of religion today. This complexity relates to the tension between an internal and an external perspective on religion. I will try to show how the disagreement between some protagonists in the debate and also the difficulties these protagonists face can be clarified by taking into account the difference between both perspectives. In the first part I discuss Marcel Gauchet’s view on the meaning of religion (...) today. In the second part I confront Gauchet with an ambiguity in his definition of religion. This ambiguity can also be found in Gauchet’s discussion with Luc Ferry, although neither Gauchet nor Ferry are capable of adequately dealing with the problem. This is because both authors are bound to an external perspective on religion, which doesn’t allow them to distinguish its specific content from other forms of meaningfulness. This is why we will concentrate in the third part on Taylor’s internal approach to religion. However, in the fourth part, we will demonstrate how such an approach is in tension with the normative ambitions Taylor seems to cherish. (shrink)

In this study we analyzed to what extent partners who share the same household affect each other's exposure to television. With the use of linear structural equation modeling we analyzed data from a large scale representative survey in The Netherlands. Results indicate that both men and women influence their partner's exposure to television. When people spend much time watching television, their partners are also likely to spend a lot of time in front of the television. These influences on each other's (...) exposure were of equal magnitude for both men and women. Finally, we found a strong socialization effect of parental viewing in the family of origin. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the relation between Bateson and Guattari’s ecological thoughts: two thinkers whose ecological ideas at first sight have a lot in common. In order to show the difference between the thoughts of both thinkers, I will take my clue from Guattari’s remark that he parts ways with Bateson on the role of context. Explaining the role of context in both authors will allow me to show how Guattari’s thought implies both an endorsement and a critique of (...) cybernetics, and, specifically, promoting a machinic rather than cybernetic ecology. I will conclude by indicating what is at stake in this distinction. (shrink)

In this paper I address the current debate on ontic versus epistemic conceptualizations of mechanistic explanation in the mechanisms literature. Illari recently argued that good explanations are subject to both ontic and epistemic constraints: they must describe mechanisms in the world in such fashion that they provide understanding of their workings. Elaborating upon Illari’s ‘integration’ account, I argue that causal role function discovery of mechanisms and their components is an epistemic prerequisite for achieving these two aims. This analysis extends Illari’s (...) account in important ways, putting more pressure on ontic readings of mechanistic explanation and providing an answer to the question how ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation are related. I argue these point in terms of cases on memory research drawn from neuroscience and research on extinct neurogenetic mechanisms from early nervous systems biology. (shrink)

This book is about the interrelationship between nature, semiosis, metarepresentation and (self-)consciousness, and the role played by metarepresentation in ...

The subject of this study is the relation between dialectic and dialogue. First an attempt is made to delineate a universe of discourse 'communication'. Mutual acknowledgement as a subject ('intersubjectivity') is proposed as a distinctive characteristic of the concept of dialogue, and a distinction is made between several classes of dialogue (see the diagram). Then the concept of dialectic is examined. Special attention is paid to the question what is to be understood by the term 'modern dialectical thinking' (from Fichte (...) onwards). Because it seems impossible to describe dialectic as a method in a methodical way, or to find some one characteristic common to such divergent dialectical philosophies as those of Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Engels, Marxism-Leninism and various forms of Neo-Marxism (L. Goldmann, Th. Adorno, E. Bloch), the proposal is made to stipulate that the terms dialectic, dialectical method and dialectical thinking in the modern sense should only be used when negation and/or contrast (in a specific sense, peculiar to the thinkers mentioned) characterize a mode of thinking in a more or less systematic way. After these preliminaries the relation between dialogue and dialectic is examined as it presents itself from an historical point of view. As regards Plato, it is contended that his dialektikê technê neither constitutes a dialogal philosophy, nor a dialogic (theory of the dialogue). His 'dialogues' rather are an instance of the 'literary dialogue' (with agogic intentions). Hegel's way of thinking is characterized as monological and speculative. Though his conception of thought as a process, as well historical as collective, does not logically exclude a dialogue, his attitude towards it seems to be rather cool (or at least ambiguous). With Marx the concept of the class struggle enters the dialectic and this concept is essentially inimical to the concept of the dialogue as a peaceful means of solving conflicts. In Marxism-Leninism the distinction between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions (necessitated by the universalization of the dialectic by Engels and the Russian pretension of having founded the socialist state) implies the view that only in socialist and communist societies fundamental contradictions are absent and that consequently only within these societies there is no need for non-peaceful means of solving conflicts. In the thought of Th. Adorno, M. Horkheimer and H. Marcuse there seems to be no room for a dialogue, as a consequence of the Utopian implications of their concept of negation. Only in J. Habermas we meet with a positive attitude towards the (social-practical) dialogue. For him the dialogue even is 'the normative foundation' of his 'critical theory' of society. Dialectic is seen by him as a consequence of a repression of the dialogue (and so the dialogue as an antidote against the dialectic of ‘Verdinglichung’). The main conclusion drawn from this historical survey is that, as far as modern dialectical thinking is concerned, dialectic exhibits an antithetic relation towards the concept of dialogue generally, and more specifically towards the 'social-practical dialogue'. With all these thinkers a positive attitude towards dialectical thinking de facto implies a negative evaluation of the dialogue (or at least coolness towards it), or conversely (Habermas). Finally the author presents some considerations of a more general nature: that dialectic and dialogue are not to be considered correlative concepts, because contrasting opinion (not dialectic) is a sufficient condition for the dialogue; that the startingpoint for a social-practical dialogue may be found in the concept of 'problematic situations related to generally accepted ends' (such as e.g. well-being); that the socialpractical dialogue is directed at a consensus indeed, at least directly, but that this does not prevent it from being directed indirectly at the truth; that the concept of synthesis constitutes the normative foundation of the dialogue, because the ideal consensus consists in a synthesis of contrasting points of view. (shrink)

Peter Strawson makes a crucial distinction between reactive attitudes and the objective attitude. Reactive attitudes such as gratefulness, anger and indignation imply that we take each other seriously as responsible agents. The objective attitude implies that we stop taking each other seriously. Strawson argues that the objective attitude is not merely psychologically difficult: it is inconceivable that we would systematically refrain from taking each other seriously and stop discussing with each other or blaming ourselves or others. Strawson, however, only discusses (...) the reactive attitudes from a general point of view. In this paper, we argue that the reactive attitudes of remorse and moral indignation are forms of ”symbolic restoration’. Retributive punishment should also be interpreted from this perspective. Consequently, our concern with moral blame cannot be understood independently from a concern with the harm that has occurred. Our attitude to the outcome determines our attitude to the agent. The concern with the mental state is secondary: it is structured by its place within the practice of symbolic restoration. (shrink)

Some alethic pluralists maintain that there are two kinds of truths operant in our alethic discourse: a realist kind and an anti-realist kind. In this paper, we argue that such a binary conception cannot accommodate certain social truths, specifically truths about race. Most alethic pluralists surprisingly overlook the status of racial truths. Douglas Edwards is, however, an exception. In his version of alethic pluralism—Determination Pluralism—racial truths are superassertible (anti-realist) true rather than correspondence (realist) true. We argue that racial truths exhibit (...) features of both superassertibility (anti-realism) and correspondence (realism). This suggests a fuzzy boundary between realist and anti-realist kinds of truth. There may be a continuum rather than a dichotomy of truths. We conclude by sketching one way for alethic pluralists to accommodate such a notion. (shrink)

This paper investigates conceptions of explanation, teleology, and analogy in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Georges Cuvier (1769-1832). Richards (2000, 2002) and Zammito (2006, 2012, 2018) have argued that Kant’s philosophy provided an obstacle for the project of establishing biology as a proper science around 1800. By contrast, Russell (1916), Outram (1986), and Huneman (2006, 2008) have argued, similar to suggestions from Lenoir (1989), that Kant’s philosophy influenced the influential naturalist Georges Cuvier. In this article, I wish to (...) expand on and further the work of Russell, Outram, and Huneman by adopting a novel perspective on Cuvier and considering (a) the similar conceptions of proper science and explanation of Kant and Cuvier, and (b) the similar conceptions of the role of teleology and analogy in the works of Kant and Cuvier. The similarities between Kant and Cuvier show, contrary to the interpretation of Richards and Zammito, that some of Kant’s philosophical ideas, whether they derived from him or not, were fruitfully applied by some life scientists who wished to transform life sciences into proper sciences around 1800. However, I also show that Cuvier, in contrast to Kant, had a workable strategy for transforming the life sciences into proper sciences, and that he departed from Kant’s philosophy of science in crucial respects. (shrink)

Dynamic Epistemic Logic This article tells the story of the rise of dynamic epistemic logic, which began with epistemic logic, the logic of knowledge, in the 1960s. Then, in the late 1980s, came dynamic epistemic logic, the logic of change of knowledge. Much of it was motivated by puzzles and paradoxes. The number … Continue reading Dynamic Epistemic Logic →.